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SQUEEZING THE JUICE®OUT OF THE WASHINGTON
REDSKINS®: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
"SCANDALOUS" AND "DISPARAGING" TRADEMARKS
AFTER HAlJO V. PRO-FOOTBALL INC.
Cameron Smith
Abstract: In Harlo v. Pro-FootballInc., the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board cancelled
the federally registered trademarks THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS, REDSKINS, and
REDSKINETIES after finding them to be disparaging matter under section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act. Pro-Football has appealed the Board's decision to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. This Note argues that Harjo's adoption of the "substantial composite"
standard for analyzing disparaging trademarks potentially ignores the majority of the
implicated group members' viewpoints and promotes section 2(a) trademark cancellations. In
addition, the liberal standing requirements for opposition and cancellation proceedings
combined with Harlo's disparagement doctrine impermissibly conflict with the protections
afforded commercial speech and the policies underlying federal trademark regulation. ProFootball Inc. v. Harlo presents the Article III system with an appropriate opportunity to
correct the Board's expansive disparagement doctrine. This correction could persuade
Congress to remedy the imbalance between the protections afforded intellectual property
owners in Article III proceedings and those provided in section 2(a) oppositions and
cancellations before the Board.

The Lanham Act gives a seller or producer the exclusive right to
register a trademark,' and to prevent competitors from using that
trademark.' As a result, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) receives thousands of trademark applications each year.3 The
Lanham Act places few restrictions on the items that may qualify for
federal registration. Courts and the PTO have authorized trademarks for
particular shapes (e.g., Coca-Cola bottles), sounds (e.g., NBC's three
chimes), fragrances, and even colors. 4 While section 2(a) of the Lanham
Act carries a presumption in favor of registrability,5 it prohibits the PTO
from approving "scandalous" or "disparaging" trademarks.6

1. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
2. Id. § 1114(1); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1227 (3d Cir. 1978)
("[A] good name is better than precious oil.") (quoting Ecclesiastes 7: 1).
3. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Performance and Accountability Report 2001,
available at http:llwww.uspto.gov/web/offices/comlannuall200l (noting that the PTO received
232,939 trademark applications in 2001) (last modified April 19,2002).
4. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (color green); In re Clarke, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1240 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (scented sewing thread).
5. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1654-55 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000).
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In Haro v. Pro-FootballInc.,7 the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(the Board) granted a section 2(a) petition to cancel the federally
registered trademarks THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS, REDSKINS,
and REDSKINETTES.' Although the Board found the Native American
petitioner's evidence insufficient to establish the level of societal outrage
necessary to cancel the trademarks on "scandalous" grounds,9 it
concluded that Pro-Football's trademarks "may disparage" Native
Americans." The Board reached this decision by limiting its analysis to a
"substantial composite" of the implicated group." Harjo's expansive
disparagement doctrine now permits any social group to challenge
unfavorable trademarks and forces the PTO to differentiate between
legitimate and non-legitimate victim groups.'
This subjective
determination exceeds the PTO's function as a federal registrar, 3 and
presents significant threats to trademark owners' intellectual property
rights due to the lack of common law 4 and statutory protection for marks
adjudged scandalous or disparaging."
This Note argues that the liberal standing requirements for opposition
and cancellation proceedings, combined with Harjo's expansive
disparagement doctrine, impermissibly conflict with the protections
afforded commercial speech and the policies underlying federal

7. 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
8. Id. at 1749.
9. Id. at 1748.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1739.
12. See, e.g., Order Sons of Italy in Am. v. Memphis Mafia Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1364, 1369
(T.T.A.B. 1999) (denying cancellation of the mark MEMPHIS MAFIA because the term "mafia" is
not disparaging to Italian Americans); Boswell v. Mavety Media Group Ltd., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600,
1609 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (dismissing opposition to the mark BLACK TAIL on adult magazines for lack
of proof that it disparages African American women).
13. See J.B. Reiter, Redskins and ScarletLetters: Why "Immoral" and "Scandalous" Trademarks
Should Be FederallyRegistrable,6 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 206-07 (1996).
14. See De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 F. 341, 346 (W.D. Pa. 1912) (holding public policy denies
common law protection to trademarks that violate statutory provisions); see also 3 J. GILSON ET AL.,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 11.08[4][h], 11-282 (2001) (noting that the trademark
infringement defense of unclean hands, though often based on allegations of fraud or
misrepresentation of source, "may result from any imaginable immoral or illegal conduct").
15. Most states pattern their laws on the Model Act, which denies protection on grounds similar to
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. See Model State Trademark Act § 2 (1964), reprinted in 3 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 22:8, at 22-15

(4th ed. 2002); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14220 (West 2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
I 10b, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 429.32 (2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§ 360-a (McKinney 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.035 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.08 (Vernon 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-92.3 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.77.020 (West 2002).
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trademark regulation. Part I provides an overview of federal trademark
protection and compares the standing requirements in Article Im courts
with those practiced in trademark opposition and cancellation
proceedings before the Board. Part II examines the interaction between
the Board's section 2(a) jurisprudence and the U.S. Supreme Court's
commercial speech doctrine. Part I summarizes the Board's decision to
cancel Pro-Football's trademarks in HarJo v. Pro-FootballInc. Part IV
argues that Haro deviated from section 2(a) precedent and created an
overly expansive disparagement doctrine. Part V maintains that Congress
should amend sections 13 and 14 of the Lanham Act to correct the
imbalance between protections afforded intellectual property owners in
Article I proceedings and those provided during section 2(a)
oppositions and cancellations before the Board. This Note concludes that
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia should declare
section 2(a) unconstitutional as applied to Pro-Football's trademarks.
I.

FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGULATION: PURPOSE,
CURRENT LEGISLATION, AND PREREQUISITES TO
PROTECTION

Trademark law is designed to foster competition and protect
consumers from false and misleading information in the marketplace. 6
Additionally, trademark regulation provides economic incentives for
product development and protects trademark owners' investments in
good will by deterring the use of unauthorized marks. 7 These policies
are reflected in current legislation such as the Lanham Act, the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, and the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act,' 8 which confer substantive federal trademark rights to
owners upon registration.
A.

The Purpose ofFederalTrademarkProtection

A trademark is any combination of words, symbols, or package
designs used to distinguish a good or service produced by one
manufacturer from those of other manufacturers." The function of a
16. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
17. See Nat'l Football League Properties, Inc. v. Allen, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1634, 1636 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. 1992) (prohibiting the sale of unauthorized merchandise bearing the trademarks REDSKINS,
BILLS, and SUPER BOWL XXVI).
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051,1125,1127 (2000).
19. See id.§ 1127.
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trademark is to allow consumers to identify the source of the article to
which it is attached. 20 By purchasing a product bearing a favorably
regarded trademark, such as POLO, ROLLS ROYCE, or TIFFANY,
consumers are assured of its value.2'
Congress established current trademark laws to support competition
and protect consumers from fraud.' To achieve this dual goal, trademark
statutes aim to prevent consumer confusion about the source of a
product,' its sponsorship,24 and its quality.' Trademark laws also
safeguard trademark owners' reputation and investments in good will by
prohibiting the use of confusingly similar 6 and tarnishing marks.2 7
B.

CurrentFederalStatutory Protectionof Trademarks

On July 5, 1946, Congress created substantive federal trademark
rights by enacting the Lanham Act.28 Unlike previous statutes, 29
registration under the Lanham Act provides a number of significant
benefits. For example, obtaining federal registration entitles a trademark
owner to prevent importation of confusingly similar goods, 0 to
constructive nationwide notice of ownership of the mark,3 ' to
incontestable status after five years of continuous use,32 and to a prima
facie presumption of validity and ownership of the mark.33 Furthermore,
20. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,412 (1916).
21. S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
22. See id. at 1276.
23. See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526,532-33 (1924).
24. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1243-44 (6th Cir. 1991) (enjoining the
sale of defendant's unauthorized Ferrari replica car kits).
25. Consumer Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 314 F. Supp. 697,703 (D.
Conn. 1970) (enjoining defendant's misrepresentation of its product's Consumer Union rating).
26. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Bait. Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 414-16 (7th Cir.
1994) (enjoining use of "Baltimore CFL Colts" because consumers might confuse the team with the
Indianapolis Colts).
27. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1190-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(enjoining use of"Enjoy Cocaine" poster).
28. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (2000)).
29. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12 (declared unconstitutional for
exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause in Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 9697 (1879)); Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946) (excluding from protection
descriptive marks, marks made up of geographic terms, and marks named after individuals and
corporations).
30. 15 U.S.C § 1124 (2000).
31. 1d. § 1072.
32. Id. § 1065.
33. Id. § 1057(b).
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a mark's owner has the right to prevent a subsequent registrant from
using a similar mark if it is likely to cause consumer confusion."4
Congress significantly expanded the Lanham Act's scope by
introducing the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988"5 and the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.36 The Dilution Act entitles owners of
famous trademarks to seek recovery against others for diminishing their
reputation and good will. 37 In response to increased trademark
infringements on the Internet, 38 Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) 3 9 Under the ACPA, remedies are
available to owners whose trademarks are appropriated for use as domain
names.4" Together, the Lanham Act and its subsequent amendments
establish a comprehensive bundle of intellectual property rights available
by federal registration.4
C.

ProceduralRequirementsfor EstablishingFederalTrademark
Protection

In order to obtain federal registration under the Lanham Act, an owner
must apply to the PTO and show either the intention to use a mark in
commerce or evidence of actual use of a mark in commerce.42
Applications for federal registration are examined by a PTO attorney for
compliance with statutory formalities, 43 and applications that do not
contain generic, scandalous or disparaging marks are approved for

34. Id. § 1114(1)(a).
35. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
36. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000)).
37. Id. § 1125(c)(1); see also Panavision Int'I L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) ("Whereas traditional trademark law sought primarily to protect consumers, dilution laws
place more emphasis on protecting the investment of the trademark owners.").
38. S. REP. No. 106-140 (1999), availableat 1999 WL 594571, *4 (1999).
39. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000)).
40. Id. § I125(d)(1)(C); see also Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214,
231-32 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that federal trademark registration serves as prima facie evidence of
a mark's validity and entitles the owner to proceed on an in rem basis under § 1125(d)(2)).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(H) (2000) (noting that federal registration is a factor in
determining whether a trademark is "distinctive and famous" and entitled to federal dilution
protection); see id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(1) (noting that a federally registered trademark in a domain
name is a factor in determining whether a "cybersquatter" has acted with "bad faith intent" to profit
from the mark).
42. 37 C.F.R. § 2.33 (2001).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), (b) (2000).
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publication in the PTO's Official Gazette." If the application is rejected,
the applicant may appeal to the Board 5 and then to the Federal Circuit or
a federal district court in the District of Columbia.46
Once a mark is published, a competitor or other potentially injured
party has thirty days to initiate an opposition proceeding before the
Board. 47 After passage of the thirty-day window, the mark is registered
and a third party may only challenge it by instituting a cancellation
proceeding. 48 The Board's conclusions in these proceedings may be
appealed to the Federal Circuit or a federal district court in the District of
Columbia.49
II.

ARTICLE III COURTS AND TRADEMARK OPPOSITION AND
CANCELLATION PROCEEDINGS EMPLOY DIFFERENT
STANDING REQUIREMENTS

Standing is a threshold issue for plaintiffs in any adjudicatory
proceeding that challenges wrongful behavior or seeks the removal of
federal rights."0 Article I tribunals are subject to constitutional and
prudential standing limitations in order to reduce marginal litigation."'
However, administrative agencies are not subject to these restraints and
are free to hear actions barred from Article Il courts.5" Recognizing the
danger that the Lanham Act's broad standing language presents to
trademark owners' intellectual property rights, the Federal Circuit
adopted Article III standing limitations for trademark opposition and
44. Id. § 1052(a), (e); see id. § 1062(a). To qualify for protection under the Lanham Act, a mark
must be primarily understood as a source identifier. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992). In this regard, generic marks such as SOAP for soap can never be protected.
See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) ("A generic term is one
that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species."). Marks that are arbitrary or
suggestive, such as DREAMWERKS for science fiction conventions, are inherently distinctive and
entitled to protection immediately upon adoption. See Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio,
142 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998). Marks that are descriptive, geographic, or surnames are not
inherently distinctive and must acquire distinctiveness through proof of secondary meaning in order
to qualify for protection. See Inwood Lab., Inc., v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.1 1 (1982)
("secondary meaning" is acquired when "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a
product feature... is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself").
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (2000).
46. Id. §§ 1071(a)(1), (b)(1).
47. Id. § 1063(a).
48. Id. § 1064.
49. Id. §§ 1071(a)(1), (b)(1).
50. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156-58 (1990).
51. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,162-63 (1997).
52. See Ecee, Inc. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 339, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981).

1300

Harov. Pro-FootballInc.
cancellation proceedings. 3 However, in Ritchie v. Simpson,5 4 the court
departed from earlier precedent and considerably weakened the
requirements necessary to initiate section 2(a) challenges."
A.

Proceedingsin Article Iff Courts

Article Il of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to
"cases" and "controversies." 56 To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff
must show: (1) an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that
the injury is redressablef 7 In this manner, Article III confines federal
judicial power to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and
to disputes capable of resolution through the judicial process. 8
In addition to Article I, prudential standing principles address
whether a plaintiff has suffered a direct and palpable injury and is within
the "zone of interests" protected by the statutory provision invoked in the
suit. 9 Prudential standing limitations exist'as an integral part of judicial
self-restraint and allow only proper parties to benefit from the court's
remedial powers.' For example, in Sierra Club v. Morton," the U.S.
Supreme Court held that an environmental organization lacked standing
to prevent a governmental agency from constructing a resort in a national
forest.' The Court noted that the policy of limiting judicial review to
entities that have a direct stake in the outcome would be compromised if
it construed the Administrative Procedure Act to grant standing to
"organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their
53. See Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenburg Corp., 823 F.2d 490,492 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
54. 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
55. See id. at 1098-99.
1.
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
57. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Sers., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
58. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
59. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). Compare
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183-85 (granting an environmental organization standing to
enforce the Clean Water Act where several of its members lived near a river polluted by the
defendant), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1992) (holding that
plaintiffs who might visit endangered species in Sri Lanka lacked standing under the Endangered
Species Act to challenge a development project in the area).
60. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986); Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489-90 n.26
(1982); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
61. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
62. Id. at 741.
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own value preferences through the judicial process. '6 In this regard, the
Court found that the organization failed to demonstrate a direct and
palpable injury from the project's development and therefore did not fall
with the "zone of interests" protected by the Administrative Procedure
64
Act.
In the trademark arena, both the Third and Fifth Circuits have placed
prudential limitations on challenges brought under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act,6" which prohibits false advertising, by adopting a standing
test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in antitrust cases.66 Applying the
Court's antitrust standing factors from Associated General Contractors
67 the Third
of California,Inc. v. CaliforniaState Council of Carpenters,
Circuit held that retailer plaintiffs do not have standing to sue
manufacturers of competing products for alleged false advertising under
section 43(a). 68 The court stressed that the plaintiffs did not suffer a
"competitive" harm,69 that their position in the distribution chain was too
remote from the injurious conduct,7" and that any damage suffered was
"if not speculative, then certainly avoidable."7 Finally, the Third Circuit
noted that granting retailer plaintiffs standing would increase marginal
litigation and undermine the Lanham Act's goals of preventing unfair
competition and protecting good will.72
63. Id. at 740.
64. Id. at 738-39.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000) ("Any person who... uses in commerce any... false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact... shall be liable in a civil action by
any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.").
66. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2001); Conte Bros.
Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,233 (3d Cir. 1998).
67. 459 U.S. 519, 538-44 (1983) (stating that five factors determine prudential standing in
antitrust cases: (1) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury; (2) the directness or indirectness of the
asserted injury; (3) the proximity or remoteness of the party to the alleged injurious conduct; (4) the
speculativeness of the damages claim; and (5) the risk of duplicative damages or complexity in
apportioning damages).
68. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 236.
69. Id. at 234.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 235.
72. Id. at 236; cf.Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, when challenges to intellectual property rights are involved, the Federal Circuit has
recognized the danger of granting standing to individuals that fail to demonstrate a judicially
cognizable injury. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 932-37 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In
Quigg, the Federal Circuit affirmed a federal district court's ruling that farmers, husbandry groups,
and organizations did not have standing to seek a declaration that animals are not patentable subject
matter:
Here appellants assert no adverse effect on any individual's rights to benefits under the patent
statute. Rather, they assert that the general public has an interest in the statutory limitations to
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B.

Opposition and CancellationProceedings

Sections 13 and 14 of the Lanham Act govern standing requirements
for opposition and cancellation proceedings before the Board, and permit
broad challenges by anyone suffering "damage" by registration of a
trademark.73 After establishing standing, a party may successfully
petition the Board to deny registration on the grounds that a trademark is
"scandalous" or "disparaging."7' 4 In an effort to prevent mere
"intermeddlers" from initiating section 2(a) proceedings,75 the Federal
Circuit, in Jewelers Vigilance Committee Inc. v. Ullenburg Corp.,76
stressed that sections 13 and 14 are consistent with the standing
requirements for Article IIT courts.77
However, since the Jewelers Vigilance decision, the Federal Circuit's
standing requirements for a direct invasion of a challengers rights and
privileges have been softened considerably.7 8 For example, in Bromberg
v. Carmel Self Service, Inc.,7 9 a group of female petitioners opposed
registration of the mark "Only a Breast in the Mouth is Better Than a Leg
in the Hand" for restaurant services." Noting that women as a class could
not challenge the mark,8 the Board granted standing because the female
petitioners fell within a "zone of real interest" in preventing
registration. 2
patentability. Essentially, appellants assert a right, as members of the public particularly
interested in animals, to sue for what they perceive to be an unwarranted interference with the
discretionary judgment of an examiner. However, it must be noted that whether patents are
allowable for animal life forms is not a matter of discretion but of law.
Id. at 929.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2000) ("[a]ny person who believes that he would be damaged"); see id.
§ 1064 ("any person who believes that he is or will be damaged").
74. Id. § 1064(3) (permitting cancellations oftrademarks that violate section 2(a)'s provisions).
75. Golden Gate Salami Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 332 F.2d 184, 188-89 (C.C.P.A. 1964);
De Walt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289 F.2d 656,661 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
76. 823 F.2d 490 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
77. See id. at 492 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1974)).
78. See Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
("The concept of damage determined in [a cancellation] proceeding by 'balancing rights and
determining whose are superior' . . . is inextricably tied to the grounds upon which the opposer
asserts damage.") (emphasis in original); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Compo Shoe Mach. Corp., 56
F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1932) ("Certainly the person seeking to cancel a registration or oppose an
application for registration must have a greater interest than a member of the general public who by
such registration suffers no invasion of his rights and privileges.").
79. 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
80. Id. at 177.
81. Id. at 178.
82. Id. at 179.
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The Federal Circuit has since explicitly extended Bromberg's logic. In
Ritchie v. Simpson,83 a divided panel reversed the Board's refusal to
permit standing84 and authorized a citizen to challenge registration of the
marks O.J., O.J. SIMPSON, and THE JUICE because the citizen was
morally outraged at O.J. Simpson's behavior.85 The court rejected the
Board's requirement that a challenger demonstrate an interest beyond
that of the general public,86 and held that Mr. Ritchie had sufficiently
pled the disparagement of his family values by the registration of marks
allegedly synonymous with "wife-beater" and "wife-murderer.""
In a pointed dissent, Judge Pauline Newman asserted that the majority
decision would turn opposition and cancellation proceedings into a
forum for attack on the morality of the registrant: "Moral indignation is
not such an interest [sufficient to confer standing]; the trademark
tribunals do not serve the busy-body and moral cop."88 Furthermore,
Judge Newman stressed that the decision discarded decades of precedent
and thereby promoted challenges by self-appointed "guardian[s] of the
register."89 Judge Newman concluded that individuals invoking section
2(a)'s scandalous and disparaging bars to trademark registration could
burden commercial speech rights in which they have no legitimate
interest, in contravention of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent.9"
I.

SECTION 2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT CREATES TWO
DISTINCT BARS TO TRADEMARK REGISTRATION:
"SCANDALOUS" AND "DISPARAGING"

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act provides that no trademark shall be
refused registration unless it "[c]onsists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or
falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions,
83. 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
84. 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1859, 1862 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
85. Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1094; see also Maura Dolan, Court Upholds $33.5-Million Verdict
Against O.J. Simpson, L.A. TIMES, April 26, 2001, at BI (noting the California Supreme Court's
decision to uphold a $33.5 million judgment against O.J. Simpson for the wrongful death of Nicole
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman despite O.J. Simpson's acquittal for their murders in 1995).
86. Ritchie, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1861.
87. Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1097.
88. Id. at 1104 (Newman J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1099 (quoting Selva & Sons, Inc. v. Nina Footwear, Inc., 705 F.2d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
90. Id.

1304

Harjo v. Pro-FootballInc.
beliefs, or national symbols."9' Since Congress did not define
"scandalous" or "disparaging" matter in the Lanham Act, the Board has
struggled with section 2(a)'s subjective nature. Generally, the Board
must make separate findings that a mark is scandalous or disparaging,"
but this distinction is often blurred. 3 Under both analyses, the Board
examines all of a mark's elements and the goods or services on which it
is used 4 Despite these similarities, a mark may be disparaging and not
scandalous on closely related facts. Furthermore, although "scandalous"
and "disparaging" prohibitions are clearly content-based," the U.S.
Supreme Court did not recognize constitutional protection for
commercial speech until thirty years after passage of the Lanham Act.
The ambiguity that currently surrounds section 2(a) enforcement often
restricts trademark owners' ability to effectively communicate through
their trademarks.
A.

"Scandalous" Trademarks

Generally, trademarks consisting of profanity or vulgarity are denied
registration as "scandalous,"9 7 while marks with ambiguous meanings
require further analysis. For example, in In re Wilcher Corp.,9 the Board
refused registration of DICKHEADS' for restaurant services due to the
mark's accompanying illustration of a human head composed of male
genitalia.9 9 However, in In re Hershey,' the Board permitted registration
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
92. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1221 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
93. See Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the TrademarkArena: Banning the Registration
of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 666 n.14 (1993) ("Section 2(a)
is really a hodge podge of several distinct statutory bars to federal trademark registration.").
94. In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1938); Doughboy Indus. v. Reese
Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 227,228 (Pat. Off. 1951).
95. Compare Old Glory, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1221 (a condom decorated with stars and stripes to
suggest the American flag not scandalous), with Doughboy, 88 U.S.P.Q. at 227-28 (packaging of
"prophylactic preparation for prevention of venereal diseases" disparaging to American soldiers).
96. Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional. See R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding a city ordinance unconstitutional because "[t]he First
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects').
97. See In re Mark David Frankel, 2002 WL 481023 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (denying registration for
SCHITrHED'S on beer); In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (denying
registration for BULLSHIT on handbags and wallets); In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443 (T.T.A.B.
1971) (denying registration for BUBBY TRAP on brassieres). But see In re Leo Quan Inc., 200
U.S.P.Q. 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (permitting registration for BADASS on stringed instrument bridges).
98. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
99. Id. at 1934.
100. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988).

1305

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:1295, 2002

of the mark BIG PECKER BRAND for T-shirts because the evidence
failed to demonstrate the vulgarity of the word "pecker..''. The Board
concluded that a majority of purchasers would not be offended by the
mark's reference to pictures of a large-beaked bird on the applicant's Tshirts.1 2 Additionally, in In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 3 after
emphasizing the "seriousness of purpose" surrounding the applicant's
crusade against sexually transmitted diseases,' the Board permitted
registration of OLD GLORY CONDOM for condoms decorated with a
design of the American flag. 5
In the 1994 case, In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 6 the Federal
Circuit reversed the Board's refusal to register BLACK TAIL for adult
entertainment magazines containing pictures of African American
women.0 7 The Federal Circuit explained the Board's inconsistent
application of section 2(a) as a function of the changes in social mores
over time. 10 8 Attempting to rationalize section 2(a) jurisprudence, the
Federal Circuit announced a three-part test: (1) the mark must be
shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety, or call out for
condemnation; (2) the mark must be considered in the context of the
marketplace as applied to only the goods or services in the application
for registration; and (3) the mark must be scandalous to a substantial
composite of the general public, as measured from the context of
contemporary attitudes.'09
By incorporating contemporary attitudes into its "scandalous"
calculus, the Federal Circuit eliminated the difficulty of reconciling
outdated societal norms with modem trademark terminology. 10
However, problems still surround application of the "substantial
composite" standard. By adopting this element, the Federal Circuit
recognized the inherent difficulty of fashioning a single objective

101. Id. at 1472.
102. Id. at 1477.
103. 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
104. Id. at 1221.
105. Id.
106. 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
107. Id. at 1370.
108. Id. at 1371.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. Compare id. at 1373 (highlighting the difficulty of determining whether a substantial
composite of the general public considers a word scandalous based on dictionary definitions), with
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485-86 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (applying dictionary definitions
contemporaneous with the passage of the Lanham Act).
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measure from numerous subjective viewpoints,"' but felt constrained by
precedent."' Although somewhat vague and unpredictable," 3 section
2(a)'s prohibition on "scandalous" trademarks has withstood due process
challenges and continues to be enforced by the "substantial composite"
4
standard."1

B.

"Disparaging"Trademarks

Unlike their scandalous counterparts, disparaging marks have received
minimal attention under section 2(a)." 5 The Board did not define
"disparagement" until 1988 in Greyhound v. Both Worlds, Inc."6 Noting
that the legislative history of the Lanham Act indicates section 2(a) was
intended to preclude registrations that conflict with another's legally
protectable rights, such as privacy and publicity," 7 the Board concluded
that disparagement is essentially a violation of the right to be "let alone"
from contempt or ridicule." 8
Drawing an analogy to tort liability, the Board adopted a two-part test:
(1) whether the communication is reasonably understood to refer to the
petitioner; and (2) whether the communication is considered offensive or
objectionable by a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities." 9
Applying this test to the applicant's mark (a silhouette of a defecating
dog as a logo for polo shirts), the Board found the mark to be disparaging
to Greyhound's running dog trademark and thus denied registration
under section 2(a). 2
111. In re Mavety Media Group Ltd, 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (1994).
112. McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485 (formulating the substantial composite standard).
113. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1654 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
114. McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484-85 (holding that although "scandalous" requires a lesser showing
of offensiveness than "obscene," it is sufficiently precise to satisfy constitutional requirements). But
see Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 405-07 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that obscene works are
entitled to federal copyright protection); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872-75 (1997) (holding
various statutory provisions prohibiting "patently offensive" and "indecent" communications
unconstitutionally vague).
115. Section 5(a) of the 1905 Act, predecessor to section 2(a), only barred marks "consisting of or
comprising immoral or scandalous matter." See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed

1946).
116. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
117. Id. at 1639 (citing Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d
1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
118. Id. (citing Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1641; see also Buffett v. Chi Chi's, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 428, 429-30 (T.T.A.B. 1985)
(permitting Jimmy Buffett to oppose a restaurant's registration of MARGARITAVILLE and
protecting his public persona under section 2(a)).
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When trademarks implicating religious beliefs or national symbols are
involved, the Board has considered evidence such as affidavits,' the
applicant's membership in the allegedly offended group,'22 and
documentary sources."z For example, in In re Hines," an applicant
sought registration of BUDDA BEACHWEAR for beach clothes."z The
PTO relied on dictionary and encyclopedia explanations of the
significance of iconography in Buddhism and denied registration because
"the use of Buddha's name and likeness to hawk beachwear tends to cast
doubt upon the quality of the beliefs of Buddhists," and the mark
"disparages Buddhists because it [commercializes] sacred symbols.' 26
Upholding the examiner's decision, the Board ignored perceptions of the
general public and held that only perceptions of those identified in some
recognizable manner by the mark are relevant.'2 7 However, after the
Federal Circuit's Mavety Media decision, 128 the Board granted a motion
for reconsideration and permitted registration of BUDDA
BEACHWEAR due to a lack of opposition from Buddhists.'29
Additionally, in In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 3 ' the PTO relied on
dictionary definitions and denied registration to MOONIES on novelty
dolls that dropped their pants, as the mark was disparaging to members
of the Unification Church founded by Sun Myung Moon.' The Board
reversed, finding that consumers are more likely to perceive the mark as
an allusion to "mooning" than a disparaging reference to a religious
sect.'32 In sum, after Hines and In Over Our Heads, the PTO and the
Board must be armed with more than "personal opinions and dictionary
sources" to successfully prohibit a mark's registration on disparaging
grounds. 3 '

121. In re Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q. 594,595 (T.T.A.B. 1963).
122. In re Condas S.A., 188 U.S.P.Q. 544 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
123. In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 304, 305 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
124. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685 (T.T.A.B. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376, 1377
(T.T.A.B. 1994).
125. Id. at 1685-86.
126. Id. at 1687-90.
127. Id. at 1688.
128. See supra notes 106-109.
129. In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376, 1377 (T.T.A.B. 1994) ("[Ilt is imperative that the Board be
careful to avoid interposing its own judgment for that of Buddhists.").
130. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
131. Id. at 1654.
132. Id.
133. In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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C.

Section 2(a) Bars to Registrationand the CommercialSpeech
Doctrine

The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 before the evolution of the
commercial speech doctrine, so the drafters of section 2(a) could not
have predicted that they were creating content-based restrictions14 on
speech." 5 While current First Amendment jurisprudence offers less
protection to commercial than political speech,3 6 the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., v. Public
Service Commission of New York 37 established several requirements
governmental actors must satisfy before suppressing speech that
proposes a commercial transaction.13 1 If commercial speech concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading, it is entitled to First Amendment
protection. 3 The government cannot regulate commercial speech unless
its interest is substantial, 4 ' directly advanced by the regulation, and the
regulation is no more extensive than necessary to accomplish its
purpose. 141 Courts applying CentralHudson 's framework have held that
governmental actors cannot prohibit commercial speech such as
solicitation of prescription drug prices,' 42 smokeless tobacco and cigar
advertising,"' 3 and beer labels displaying alcohol content.'"
Despite Central Hudson's substantial interest and narrowly tailored
requirements, several members of the U.S. Supreme Court have recently
suggested that strict scrutiny is appropriate for commercial speech
regulations. 145 In 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,146 a plurality of the
134. See supranote 96 and accompanying text.
135 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that commercial speech is
not protected by the First Amendment).
136. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,455-65 (1978).
137. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
138. Id. at 566.
139. Id.
140. See, eg., Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262-64 (1952) (preventing racial unrest from
discriminatory publications); Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 176, 177-78
(T.T.A.B. 1978) (eliminating PTO endorsement of offensive trademarks).
141. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
142. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1509 (2002); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,773 (1976).
143. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561-67 (2001).
144. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1995); Utah Licensed Beverage Ass'n
v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1071 (10th Cir. 2001).
145. See, eg., Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572 (Kennedy, Scalia, JJ., concurring); id. at 572-73
(Thomas, J., concurring); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501, 51014 (1996); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).

1309

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:1295, 2002

Court split over whether to apply strict scrutiny while striking down a
state prohibition on the advertising of liquor prices.' 47 After classifying
newspaper advertisements containing the word "WOW" next to liquor
bottles as commercial speech,"' the Court found that governmental
actors retain "less regulatory authority when... commercial speech
149
restrictions strike at 'the substance of the information communicated.""
The Court concluded that Central Hudson's review standard should
apply, 5 ° and held that the advertising ban did not advance Rhode
Island's interest in protecting its citizens from the vices of alcohol to a
"material degree."'' In separate concurring opinions, Justice Thomas
52
and Justice Scalia voiced concerns with the Central Hudson test
While Justice Scalia concluded that the briefing was inadequate to
formulate a suitable replacement,5 3 Justice Thomas concluded that
governmental interests aiming "to keep legal users of a product or
service ignorant in order to manipulate
their choices in the marketplace"
54
illegitimate.
se
per
should be
Regardless of the level of scrutiny applied by the U.S. Supreme Court,
trademarks that provide information about a product are considered a
form of commercial speech and are entitled to protection under the First
Amendment.' However, the Court has not clarified whether items that
only convey a product's source, such as logos or slogans, enjoy First
Amendment protection.'56 Nonetheless, both the Second and Sixth
Circuits have extended commercial speech protection into these areas.'57
146. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
147. Id. at 489.
148. Id. at 492-93.
149. Id. at 499 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 504 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
151. Id. at 505 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
152. Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 518-19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 518.
154. Id.
155. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (holding that the use of the trade name "Texas
State Optical" is a form of commercial speech).
156. Cases upholding First Amendment protection for commercial speech have involved the
dissemination of information to consumers. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996) (price of beer); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (alcoholic
content of beer); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (benefits of using electricity); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977) (residential "for sale" signs).
157. See Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1998)
(classifying a beer label with a frog "giving the finger" and the accompanying slogan "The beer so
good ... it's bad" as commercial speech); Sambo's Rest., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686,
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IV. AFTER HARJO, FEDERALLY REGISTERED TRADEMARKS
THAT "MAY DISPARAGE" A "SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE"
OF AN IMPLICATED GROUP ARE SUBJECT TO
CANCELLATION
The Board broke new ground in 1999 by granting a section 2(a)
petition to cancel a federally registered trademark.' 8 In Haro v. ProFootball Inc.,' 9 the Board found the Native American petitioners'
evidence insufficient to establish the level of societal outrage necessary
to cancel Pro-Football's trademarks on "scandalous" grounds.' 60 But, by
limiting its analysis to a "substantial composite" of the implicated
group,' the Board concluded that Pro-Football's trademarks "may be
disparaging" to Native Americans.' 62
A.

Background andProceduralHistory

In 1937, the Boston Braves football franchise moved to Washington,
D.C. and changed its name to the Washington Redskins.'6 In 1967, the
team obtained federal registration for the mark THE REDSKINS in
stylized script.'6 The team's remaining trademarks, issued from 1974
6
through 1990, include: THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS,' 1
67
REDSKINS, 166 and REDSKINETTES.'
In September 1992, Susan Harjo, along with six other Native
Americans, petitioned the Board to cancel the Washington Redskins'
trademarks on the grounds that the word "redskin" is an offensive,
scandalous, and disparaging designation for a Native American person.168
Pro-Football responded by asserting that the petitioners lacked standing
to challenge the registrations, that section 2(a) unconstitutionally
694 (6th Cir. 1981) (classifying a restaurant's service mark as commercial speech because it
provides consumers with valuable information about the restaurant's quality).
158. See George Likourezos, A Case of FirstImpression:American IndiansSeek Cancellationof
the Trademarked Term "Redskins," 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 275,276 (1996).
159. 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
160. Id. at 1749.
161. Id. at 1739.
162. Id. at 1748.
163. Id. at 1727.
164. Id. at 1707 (Registration No. 836,122, issued Sept. 26, 1967).
165. Id. (Registration No. 978,824, issued Feb. 12, 1974).
166. Id. (Registration No. 1,085,092, issued Feb. 7, 1978).
167. Id. (Registration No. 1,606,810, issued July 17, 1990).
168. Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1829 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
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impinges on the First Amendment and that section 2(a) violates the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process. 169 In a 1994 pre-trial ruling, the
Board granted petitioners standing and struck each of Pro-Football's
affirmative defenses. 70 The Board refused to address the First and Fifth
Amendment issues,
noting that it lacked authority to declare section 2(a)
7
unconstitutional.' '

On April 2, 1999, the Board issued cancellation orders for all of ProFootball's trademarks, 7 2 because the trademarks "may be disparaging of
Native Americans to a substantial composite of this group," and "may
bring Native Americans into contempt or disrepute.' ' 73 On June 1, 1999,
Pro-Football sought review of the Board's decision in a federal district
court for the District of Columbia."

The district court subsequently

denied a motion to dismiss Pro-Football's statutory and constitutional
175
challenges.

B.

Pro-Football'sTrademarksAre Not Scandalous

After dismissing Pro-Football's constitutional attacks on section 2(a),
the Board addressed the appropriate legal standard for analyzing
scandalous marks.7 6 Condensing the guidelines established by the
Federal Circuit in Mavety Media, 7 7 the Board espoused a two-step
process.'78 First, the Board must determine the likely meaning of the
matter in question; next, the Board must determine whether the matter is
scandalous to a substantial composite of the general public.' 79
When determining the likely meaning of the matter in question, the
Board examined the relationship between the matter and all other
elements of the mark, the goods or services on which the mark is used, 8 '

169. Id. at 1830.
170. Id. at 1830-33.
171. Id. at 1833.
172. Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1749 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
173. Id. at 1748.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4) (2000).
175. Pro-Football Inc. v. Harjo, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1140, 1146 (D.D.C. 2000).
176. Haro, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1735.
177. See supranotes 106-109 and accompanying text.
178. Haro, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1736.
179. Id. at 1736-37.
180. Cf In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. 512, 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (permitting registration of
ACAPULCO GOLD, noting that while the mark may be a synonym for marijuana, when used on
suntan lotion it suggests the resort city of Acapulco).
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and the manner of use in the marketplace. 8 ' Relying on the testimony of
the seven Native American petitioners, dictionary definitions, linguistic
experts, an analysis of Western genre films, and a telephone survey that
resulted in thirty-six percent of the Native Americans sampled stating
they were offended by "redskin(s),"' 82 the Board found the word
"redskin(s)" to carry an allusion to Native Americans.' Furthermore,
the Board found this allusion supported by the mark's incorporation of a
Native American in profile. 8
Despite the allusion to Native Americans, the Board concluded that a
substantial composite of the general population would not find the
'85
trademark "shocking to the[ir] sense of truth, decency, or propriety.' 1
The significant amount of media coverage and fan support devoted to the
Washington Redskins since the 1940's was thus inconsistent with a sense
of outrage from the general population necessary to a finding of
scandalousness.'86 Therefore, the petitioners failed the test's second
prong and the Board denied cancellation.'87
C.

Pro-Football'sTrademarksAre Disparaging

The language of section 2(a) makes clear that a trademark is invalid if
it "consists of or comprises... scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.... .,188 Therefore, the Lanham
Act requires the Board to engage in a separate, and potentially more
difficult, disparagement analysis.'89 First, the Board determined the
"ordinary" meaning of "disparage."'19 Next, it ascertained the meaning of

181. Haro,50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1736.
182. Id. at 1723-33. Additionally, 46.2% of the 300 non-Native American adults surveyed stated
that they were offended by the term "redskin." Id. at 1733.
183. Id. at 1742.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1748.
186. Id. at 1749.
187. Id.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
189. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patentson H.R.
4744, 76th Cong. 18-21 (1939) (statement of Thomas E. Robertson) ("The word 'disparage' is too
comprehensive in meaning."); (statement of Assistant Commissioner Frazer) ("I am afraid that the
use of that word [disparage] is going to cause a great deal of difficulty in the Patent Office,
because.., it is always going to be just a matter of the personal opinion of the individual parties as
to whether they think [the mark] is disparaging."); Baird, supranote 93, at 667.
190. Haro,50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1737.
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the marks in question, and, finally, decided whether their meaning was
disparaging.' 91
The Board began its analysis by referring to dictionary definitions and
concluded that, in relation to groups, symbols, or beliefs, matter is
disparaging if it may "dishonor by comparison with what is
inferior... degrade ... or injure by unjust comparison.' 92 The Board
then drew two significant distinctions between "scandalous" and
"disparaging" matter under section 2(a). Because of section 2(a)'s focus
on identifiable objects, 93 the Board concluded that the general public's
94
viewpoints are irrelevant to whether or not matter is disparaging.
Second, the Board found that the inclusion of the term "may" before
"disparage" negated a requirement of intent. 95 These two differences
enabled the Board to arrive at different conclusions on the "scandalous"
and "disparagement" analyses. 96
To determine the meaning of the marks in question, the Board focused
on the meaning of Pro-Football's trademarks at their dates of
registration. 197 Based on the entire record, the Board concluded that
"redskin(s)" is a denotative term for Native Americans. 98 Furthermore,
in connection with Pro-Football's entertainment services, the Board
found "redskin(s)" to carry an allusion to Native Americans 99 that
continues despite the term's frequent use in popular culture and the
media to identify the Washington D.C. football club."°
Finally, the Board had to decide, given the meaning of "redskin(s)" in
connection with entertainment services, if Pro-Football's marks were
disparaging.2 ' To accomplish this task, the Board adopted a "substantial
composite" of the implicated group test.20 2 Although the Board did not
quantify what a "substantial composite" means, its new test combined
the standard used by the Federal Circuit in "scandalous" cases, 0 3 with

191. Id.
192. Id. at 1738.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000).
194. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
195. Id. at 1738.
196. Id. at 1749.
197. Id. at 1741.
198. Id. at 1742.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1739.
202. See id. at 1740.
203. See supranotes 106-109 and accompanying text.
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the Board's viewpoint analysis from In re Hines.2 04 Applying its newly
formulated test, the Board held that the word "redskin(s)," in connection
with Pro-Football's trademarks, retained a derogatory character and
disparaged a substantial composite of Native Americans. °5 Accordingly,
the Board canceled Pro-Football's "redskin(s)" trademarks. 0°
V.

HARJO CREATES AN OVERLY EXPANSIVE
DISPARAGEMENT DOCTRINE AND PROMOTES
SECTION 2(A) TRADEMARK CANCELLATIONS

The Harjo Board's adoption of the "substantial composite" approach
potentially ignores the majority of the implicated group members'
viewpoints when deciding whether a trademark is disparaging and
deviates from precedent in two important aspects. First, the Board
ignored Greyhound's definition of disparagement for third party
trademark opposition proceedings0 7 and second, the Board disregarded
In Over Our Heads' viewpoint analysis for disparaging trademarks that
reference a particular group. 8 Additionally, the Harjo Board erred by
failing to consider Pro-Football's marks in the context of contemporary
attitudes and by affording inadequate weight to Pro-Football's good faith
intent and the respectful nature of its trademark usage. When this case
comes up for appeal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
should reject the Haro Board's expansive disparagement doctrine and
apply Greyhound's definition of disparagement.
A.

The BoardErredby Adopting the "SubstantialComposite"
Standardfor Analyzing DisparagingTrademarks

The Board's "substantial composite" approach enables it to fix a
percentage, potentially below a majority,20 9 of a group's viewpoints that
are relevant and a percentage that are not.2" 0 The Board's analysis forced
it to draw an arbitrary line that excluded the sixty-four percent of Native
Americans who were surveyed and not offended by Pro-Football's

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
Haro, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1748.
Id. at 1749.
See supranotes 116-119 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 130-132.
Haro,50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1746.
Id. at 1734-35.
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trademarks.2 1 'To reach its decision, the Board relied on its analysis from
In re Hines,21 2 but Hines involved a PTO examiner's denial of
registration and not a third party challenge.2 " Furthermore, Hines
involved an application for a potentially disparaging trademark that
incorporated a religious icon's name and likeness, 214 and the Board never
employed a substantial composite analysis. 2 5 After the Federal Circuit's
Mavety Media decision,1 6 the Hines Board reconsidered its decision,2 7
and concluded that the PTO lacked sufficient evidence of disparagement
to deny BUDDA BEACHWEAR registration.2 8 Thus, the HaroBoard's
purported reliance on Hines was misplaced, and its adoption of the
substantial composite standard was inappropriate.
Additionally, Haro ignored the Board's analysis in In Over Our
Heads, which involved a trademark application for a potentially
derogatory group reference. 1 9 After noting that dictionary definitions
described "Moonie(s)" as members of the Unification Church, the Board
found persuasive numerous articles incorporating the term and reasoned
"[w]e doubt that such major newspapers and magazines would have
repeatedly used a term derogatory of a particular religious group."2 0 In
In Over Our Heads, the Board did not employ a substantial composite
analysis, but rather focused on the viewpoint of purchasers of goods
bearing the MOONIES mark, and whether they would perceive it as
ridiculing members of the Unification Church." l Thus, by ignoring the
perceptions of purchasers of "redskin(s)" merchandise and the media's
widespread use of the term in connection with the Washington, D.C.
football club, 2z the Board disregarded In Over Our Heads' reasonable
person approach and applied an incorrect viewpoint analysis.
By incorporating the substantial composite standard into its
disparagement analysis, the Board has perpetuated the uncertainty and

211. Seeid. at 1746.
212. See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 43-46.
214. See Baird, supra note 93, at 669 n.21 ("The cases dealing with religious matter... seem
particularly well suited for application under the disparaging rubric of § 2(a).").
215. In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685, 1692 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (Hanak, J., dissenting).
216. See supra notes 106-109.
217. In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
218. Id. at 1377.
219. See supra notes 130-131.
220. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1654 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
221. Id. at 1654.
222. See Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1746 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
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ambiguity that has plagued "scandalous" proceedings over the years.'
Moreover, the substantial composite standard places tremendous weight
on survey evidence that may not accurately depict the implicated group's
viewpoints.224 For example, in contrast to the petitioner's survey
evidence, a recent Harris Poll of three hundred and fifty-one Native
Americans revealed that seventy-five percent were not offended by the
name "redskins" and that sixty-nine percent feel it is acceptable for ProFootball to continue using the name."'
Thus, the district court hearing Haro on appeal can take a substantial
step toward harmonizing the divergent applications of section 2(a) by
reinstating the Greyhound test and evaluating disparaging marks from
the standpoint of a "reasonable person." 6 Tort doctrines addressing an
individual's privacy rights, 7 publicity rights, 8 and defamation" have
used a variation of the "reasonable person" standard effectively without
employing a substantial composite analysis. These doctrines offer
protection for individuals offended by the publication of damaging
trademarks while still permitting the viewpoints of dissenting group
members and consumers to be taken into account." Incorporating tort
law into the Board's disparagement doctrine would harmonize section
2(a) With its legislative history, ensure that a trademark is harmful

223. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 487 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, Baldwin, J.,dissenting)
(criticizing the substantial composite standard: "[I] am at a loss to know what [substantial
composite] means or how one can have a 'composite' of a class such as 'the general public.').
224. See Marc Fisher, American IndiansAmong Admirers of Redskins Name, WASHINGTON POST,
Jan. 26, 2002, at BI (Walter Wetzel, former chairman of the Blackfoot tribe, said, "[ilt made us all
so proud to have an Indian on a big-time team ....[O]nly a small group of radicals [ ]oppose those
names. Indians are proud of Indians."); see also Rebekah Denn, School Board to Decide Use of
'Indian' Mascots, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 10, 2002, at Al (after noting that the
Duvwamish Tribe did not find the West Seattle high school "Indian" mascot to be offensive, Don
Hatch, a member of the Tulalip Tribal Council, said that he saw tribal names as a source of pride for
Indians and that taking them away "is taking part of us away").
225. S.L Price, The Indian Wars, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 4,2002, at 72.
226. Cf.McBride v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 977 P.2d 467, 470-71 (Utah 1999) (adopting
reasonable person standard to determine whether "redskin" license plates are offensive or
derogatory).
227. RESTATErdENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).

229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) ("Although defamation is not a
question of majority opinion, neither is it a question of the existence of some individual or
individuals with views sufficiently peculiar to regard as derogatory what the vast majority of persons
regard as innocent").
230. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 773

n.17 (5th ed. 1984) (defining defamation as "words which tend to expose one to public hatred,
shame ... contempt, ridicule ...degradation or disgrace").

231. See supranotes 117, 189 and accompanying text.
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before it is stripped of federal protection, and interject predictability and
consistency into the analysis of disparaging marks.
B.

The BoardErredby DisregardingPro-Football'sGood Faith
Intent

Pro-Football maintains that its intent in adopting the WASHINGTON
REDSKINS name and logo was "entirely positive" and that the team
name has "reflected positive attributes of the American Indian such as
dedication, courage and pride. '""2 However, the Board, focusing on the
connection between "may" and "disparage" in section 2(a), found ProFootball's intent largely irrelevant. 3 The Board thus ignored the
substantial weight its previous decisions had afforded an applicant's
purpose inadopting a mark and seeking federal registration.
In Old Glory, the Board held that the "seriousness of purpose"
surrounding a mark's promotion and use is a significant factor in whether
it is offensive.23 ' Accordingly, although potentially offensive to a large
number of Americans, the Board permitted registration of a condom with
a design of the American flag due to the solemn and patriotic nature of
the product's packaging and the applicant's fight against AIDS.23' The
Board again emphasized an applicant's intent in Wilcher where the
applicant claimed that DICKHEADS' was an innocent double entendre
used to promote Richard Heads' Bar & Restaurant. 6 Noting that both
vulgar and non-vulgar dictionary definitions exist for the term
"dickhead," the Board found the mark's accompanying illustration of
male genitalia indicative of the applicant's intent to project a vulgar
connotation.n7
Pro-Football's "seriousness of purpose" and intent to honor the
positive attributes of Native Americans is demonstrated by the mark's
design elements and its use in connection with a respected
organization. 21' Although both disparaging and non-disparaging
dictionary definitions of "redskin(s)" exist,23 9 unlike the mark at issue in
Wilcher, Pro-Football's marks are accompanied by a neutral design of a
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
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Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1721 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
Id. at 1738 n.100.
See supra notes 103-105.
In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1221 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
See supranotes 98-99.
In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929, 1934 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1741 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
Id. at 1730.
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Native American in profile and do not attempt to project a disparaging
connotation. Furthermore, similar to the mark's packaging and
promotion in Old Glory, Pro-Football uses its mark in a respectful
manner and in connection with a professional sport that exemplifies
courage and dedication.240
C.

The BoardErred by DisregardingPro-Football'sTrademarks'
Secondary Meaning

In addition to dismissing Pro-Football's "seriousness of purpose," the
Board addressed Pro-Football's trademarks from their dates of
registration rather than the date of the Native American's petition.24'
Analyzing Pro-Football's marks from their dates of registration permitted
the Board to discount the strong "secondary meaning"242 attached to THE
REDSKINS since its inception in 1967.243 The Board correctly noted that
proof of secondary meaning is not a complete defense to claims under
section 2(a);2 " nevertheless, it afforded the mark's nationwide use in
connection with the Washington, D.C. football club minimal weight.245
Furthermore, viewing marks at their time of registration ignores social
changes from 1967 through 1999 and frustrates the Federal Circuit's
mandate to consider marks in their current context.24
In Mavety Media, the Federal Circuit registered BLACK TAIL for
adult entertainment magazines. 4 7 Dismissing challenges that the mark
depicted African American women as sexual objects, the court noted that
"[t]oday's scandal can be tomorrow's vogue,"24" and found various
dictionary definitions of "tail" unpersuasive in establishing the mark's
offensiveness.249 The court went on to stress the importance of examining
a questionable mark in view of its relevant marketplace and in the
240. Id. at 1721.
241. Id. at 1735.
242. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Int'l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty
Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1086-88 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the longer a Irademark is in use, the
stronger the likelihood of establishing secondary meaning).
243. Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1708 n.12 (T.T.A.B. 1999); see id. at 1749
(noting the "voluminous" number of references to the Washington Redskins in news articles since
the 1940s and the general acceptance of"redskin(s)" in connection with the football club).
244. Harjo,30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1832.
245. Haro,50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741 n.1 10.
246. In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367,1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
247. Id. at 1370.
248. Id. at 1371.
249. Id. at 1374.
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context of contemporary attitudes: "Proof abounds in nearly every
quarter, with the news and entertainment media today vividly portraying
degrees of violence and sexual activity that, while popular25 today, would
have left the average audience of a generation ago aghast.
Accordingly, the Board's refusal to consider the secondary meaning
attached to Pro-Football's marks in their current environm ent
contravenes Federal Circuit precedent and the Lanham Act's purpose of
protecting a trademark owner's reputation and good will.21 While
"redskin(s)" carried a negative connotation in Western genre films
during the 1960s;2 today, it encompasses a different meaning in the
context of a professional sports team. Furthermore, through national
marketing and societal rejection of the term's use to identify Native
Americans, 3 Pro-Football's marks have become synonymous with the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area and the positive attributes
exemplified by its football team.
D.

Harjo Contravenes the Policies of PreventingConsumer Confusion
and ProtectingTrademark Owners' Investments

The primary impetus behind trademark regulation is to provide the
general public with accurate information about product source and
quality.2 4 If cancellation is permitted after a mark has established itself
as identifying a particular source of goods, consumer confusion will
result when another producer sells similar goods under the same mark or

250. Id. at 1371. See also In re Thomas Labs. Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. 50, 52 (T.T.A.B. 1975); In re
Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. 334, 335 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (registering WEEK-END SEX for magazines, the
Board noted that "consideration must be given to the moral values and conduct fashionable at the
moment, rather than that of past decades").
251. See United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1990); Boston Athletic Ass'n v.
Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 32 (lst Cir. 1989); see also Chattanooga Mfg., Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 301 F.3d
789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that trademark holder's fourteen year delay in assertion of
infringement claim "prejudiced" the alleged infringer for purpose of laches defense, since the alleged
infringer spent millions of dollars promoting its products and had achieved position of market
leader); Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir.
1975) (noting that trademark protection extends to the time, money, and effort needed to create a fan
base).
252. Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1732 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
253. See U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.con, Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding
that advertising expenditures, consumer studies linking the mark to a source, sales success,
unsolicited media coverage, and the length and exclusivity of the mark's use are all relevant to the
establishment of secondary meaning); Roux Labs. Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823, 829-30
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
254. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985).
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the original goods are produced under a different mark. 255 For example,
the Board's disparagement doctrine would now permit a cancellation
proceeding against a mark such as FIGHTING IRISH on the grounds
that it may disparage a "substantial composite" of Irish Americans.
As one of the preeminent athletic programs in the nation, consumers
expect goods licensed by the University of Notre Dame and bearing the
FIGHTING IHISH mark to represent quality athletic wear. 6 If the mark
is cancelled after establishing an association with Notre Dame, then
competitors could benefit from the university's reputation and produce
"knock-offs" under the FIGHTING IRISH mark."5 Thus, cancellation of
established marks breaks down the flow of information to consumers and
results in confusion and wasted resources when consumers attempt to
differentiate officially sanctioned goods from lower-quality imitations.5 8
VI. THE BOARD'S LIBERAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS
AND EXPANSIVE DISPARAGEMENT DOCTRINE
IMPERMISSIBLY CONFLICT WITH THE PROTECTIONS
AFFORDED COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE POLICIES
UNDERLYING FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGULATION
The Federal Circuit has limited section 2(a) opposition and
cancellation proceedings before the Board by incorporating the standing
restrictions imposed upon Article II tribunals."' However, in its 1994
pre-trial ruling, the Harjo Board authorized petitioner's section 2(a)
challenge to Pro-Football's marks based on allegations of personal
offensiveness without requiring proof of actual damage. 6 Absent
evidence that a trademark's registration causes a legally cognizable
injury, its cancellation under section 2(a) fails to advance the
"substantial" governmental interest necessary to satisfy Central

255. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("Both the mark's fame and the consumer's trust in that symbol ... are subject to exploitation by
free riders."); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267,272 (1988).
256. See Univ. of Ga. Athletic Assoc. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985); White v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 614 N.W.2d 330,338-40 (Neb. 2000).
257. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562,568-69 (9th Cir. 1968).
258. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2:5, at 2-8 ("[Tjrademarks reduce the buyer's cost of
collecting information about products by narrowing the scope of information into brand segments
rather than have the buyer start anew with each single product.").
259. Jewelers Vigilance Comm. Inc. v. Ullenburg Corp., 823 F.2d 490,492 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
260. Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1830 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
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Hudson's framework for commercial speech regulation. 26' Thus, due to
the Harjo Board's failure to require petitioners to prove actual damage
from the registration of Pro-Football's marks, the district court should
hold the "redskin(s)" marks' cancellation under section 2(a)
unconstitutional.
A.

The Standing Requirementsfor Oppositionand Cancellation
ProceedingsRequire Strengtheningto Prevent Unconstitutional
Applications of Section 2(a)

Harjo deviated substantially from Federal Circuit precedent that
requires section 2(a) challengers to demonstrate a "distinct and palpable
injury."" In its 1994 ruling granting the Native American petitioners
standing to challenge Pro-Football's marks,263 the Board rejected a
pleading requirement of actual damage and instead held that standing
exists when a challenger alleges an interest in the proceeding beyond that
of the general public.2 ' 4 The Board's analysis failed to address, much less
resolve, whether petitioners suffered a legally cognizable injury; it
merely assumed that petitioners' status as members of North American
26
Indian tribes constituted sufficient "damage" to confer standing.
Five years later, in Ritchie v. Simpson, the Federal Circuit followed
Harjo's lead and eroded decades of its own precedent2 66 by granting Mr.
Ritchie standing to challenge O.J Simpson's trademarks based on his
status as a "family man.

267

Stripping away prior limitations on the "any

person" and "damage" clauses of sections 13 and 14, the court
recognized sufficient "damage" to Mr. Ritchie's moral values upon
registration of marks associated with O.J. Simpson's alleged criminal
conduct. 26' The Federal Circuit's unprecedented decision in Ritchie
261. See supranotes 137-140 and accompanying text.
262. Jewelers Vigilance Comm. Inc. v. Ullenburg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1974)).
263. Haro, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1830.
264. Id. at 1832.
265. Id. at 1830.
266. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text; William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil,
Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY
TECH L.J. 725, 729 (2000); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial
Activism?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 688 (1993) ("I caution against ... policy-driven activism
whereby the application of the law will not be known until the Federal Circuit hears the case .... It
is policy choices that lead to departure from precedent, into the judicial activism that weighs against
legal stability.").
267. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
268. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 20:7, at 20-18 ("The O.J. Simpson decision contains
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allowed the Haro Board to affirm its inadequate standing analysis, in
which actual harm is not required and standing is appropriate when a
challenger alleges that a mark is personally offensive.269
Accordingly, Congress should strengthen the current standing
requirements for opposition and cancellation proceedings in order to
protect trademark registrants' commercial speech rights and eliminate
use of the PTO as a forum for moral objections.27 ° Congressional
amendments to sections 13 and 14 should incorporate modified versions
of the pleading requirements necessary to establish causes of action for
the torts of defamation27 1 and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 2 Thus, amendments requiring a challenger to demonstrate (1)273a
disparaging trademark, (2) intent to cause harm or emotional distress,
and (3) the existence of actual harm resulting from the trademark's
registration would eliminate problems associated with defining the scope
of "damage" necessary to maintain section 2(a) cancellation and
opposition proceedings.2 74 This approach would restore objectivity to
section 2(a) challenges and reconcile trademark law with the requisite
personal injury necessary
to challenge other types of federal intellectual
275
protection.
property
Applying this heightened standing test to Harjo, the petitioners would
have failed prongs (2) and (3) because they had not demonstrated ProFootball's intent to disparage or actual harm, either in the form of social
aversion or financial damage, by the use of T=E REDSKINS mark in
the seeds of an administrative and judicial chaos in which harassment before the Trademark Board
becomes a weapon of the contentious militant, combative extremist, and well-funded activist.").
269. Haijo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1735 n.89 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
270. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting).
Heightened standing requirements are consistent with the purpose of the Lanham Act and Federal
Circuit precedent. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text; Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v.
Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,227-31 (3d. Cir. 1998); Jewelers Vigilance Comm. Inc. v.
Ullenburg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 492-94 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Additionally, section 13 and 14's "any
person" and "damage" provisions are not defined in the Lanham Act and both th6 Third and Fifth
Circuits have interpreted identical language in section 43(a) to permit the adoption of more stringent
standing requirements in order to reduce litigation. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
272. Id.§ 46.
273. Id. § 580B cmt. d.
274. Id. § 575 cmt. b, § 576 cmt. e.
275. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in
IntellectualPropertyLaw, 74 TtJL. L REv. 1323, 1380 (2000) ("If there is any logic to the liberality
of the trademark standing rules, in comparison with those in copyright and especially in patent law,
it probably stems from the fact that trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights, are intended primarily
to serve a consumer protection function."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000) (limiting standing to a
copyright owner, assignee, and exclusive licensee); 35 U.S.C. §§ 261,281 (2000) (limiting standing
to a patent owner and assignee).
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connection with a respected professional organization.276 However, under
this standard, they would have had standing to challenge the registration
of "redskin(s)" for products that do not emphasize positive attributes of
Native Americans, such as weapons or alcohol.2 77 Additionally, applying
this test to O.J. Simpson's marks, Mr. Ritchie would have failed prongs
(2) and (3) because the alleged injury to his "family values" is too
speculative and abstract.2 But, a member of O.J. Simpson's alleged
victims' families would have standing if Mr. Simpson applied for
registration of THE JUICE on leather gloves or knives, due to the
foreseeable severe emotional distress it would cause to have Mr.
Simpson's trademarks on products associated with the murder of Nicole
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman.279
B.

The Cancellation ofPro-Football'sTrademarks Under Section 2(a)
is Unconstitutional

In response to commercial speech concerns, the Federal Circuit
continues to maintain that cancellations under section 2(a) are
constitutional because the denial of federal protection does not prohibit a
mark's use.280 This position ignores the damaging consequences of
removing a trademark owner's ability to bring infringement actions and
maintain the quality and integrity of his or her marks.28 ' While the Board
in Harolacked the authority to declare section 2(a) unconstitutional,282 a
federal district court in the District of Columbia has the authority to
address constitutional questions and will be able to review Pro-Football's
claim that section 2(a) abridges its right to communicate through its
trademarks.283
In order for Central Hudson's protections to apply, Pro-Football's
trademarks must qualify as a lawful and non-misleading form of
commercial speech. 2 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
commercial speech is identified by the proposal of a commercial

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. b. (1977).
See Hornell Brewing Co., Inc. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d (1965).
See supranote 85 and accompanying text.
In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
McGowan v. Marshall, 604 F.2d 885, 892 (5th Cir. 1979).
Material Supply Int'l, Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See supra notes 137-141.
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transaction, 28 ' and several courts286 and commentators287 have concluded
that trademarks satisfy this test due to their relationship with product
advertising and sales. While this classification may not apply to
trademarks registered prior to their use in commerce,288 trademarks that
are used in commerce for some time and acquire secondary meaning
communicate
valuable
information
to
consumers. 289
The
WASHINGTON REDSKINS trademark has been used in commerce for
seventy years and' its placement on merchandise represents official
endorsement by the team. The mark enables consumers to differentiate
between authorized goods and lesser quality imitations.290 Thus, ProFootball's trademark, when used in connection with officially licensed
transaction and conveys
merchandise, proposes a commercial
291
quality.
product
about
information
Because Pro-Football's trademarks are entitled to protection as
commercial speech, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
should apply CentralHudson s three-part test to their cancellation under
section 2(a).9 2 Stripping a famous mark such as WASHINGTON
REDSKINS of federal protection would satisfy CentralHudson's second
and third prongs 3 because of the large amount of cheap imitations that
would flood the market 94 In this regard, Pro-Football's inability to bring
infringement actions would decrease the value of its trademarks so
dramatically that it would likely abandon them, thus directly advancing
the government's interest in eliminating disparaging marks.29
Furthermore, since section 2(a) cancellations only apply to a limited

285. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993).
286. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting); Hornell
Brewing Co., Inc. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady,
944 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
287. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 31:139, at 31-221 ("It would appear clear that a firm's
trademark is the most important element of commercial speech which is communicated to
customers."); see Tracie Rozhon, DroppingLogos That Shout, Luxury Sellers Try Whispers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at Al.
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2000).
289. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979).
290. See Sambo's Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686,694 (6th Cir. 1981).
291. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
292. See supranotes 137-141 and accompanying text.
293. See supranote 141.
294. See Paul E. Loving, Native American Team Names in Athletics: It's Time to Trade These
Marks, 13 LOy. LA. ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1992).
295. See id. at 2-3.
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class of marks adjudged "scandalous" or "disparaging," it is not an overextensive regulation.296
Although section 2(a) satisfies Central Hudson's proportionality
review, the cancellation of Pro-Football's trademarks is unconstitutional
under Central Hudson's first prong because it does not advance a
"substantial" governmental interest.297 Courts and the PTO have
recognized two governmental interests sufficient for sustaining
trademark cancellations under sections 2(a): preventing racial unrest and
eliminating PTO endorsement of disparaging marks.298 Governmental
actors thus have the power to prohibit publications that promote friction
among racial and religious groups.299 Section 2(a) cancellations arguably
protect groups from exposure to "disparaging" publications; however,
U.S. Supreme Court decisions have significantly weakened
governmental actor's ability to proscribe offensive communications."'
Therefore, it seems unlikely that canceling a trademark such as
WASHINGTON REDSKINS will advance a "substantial" governmental
interest due to the mark's failure to incite violence during its seventyyear history.3"'
The second governmental justification for section 2(a) cancellations
arose in Bromberg v. Carmel Self Service, Inc., 2 where female
petitioners alleged that federal registration of disparaging marks lowers
the standards of the PTO. 3 The Board subsequently discredited this
argument in Old Glory when it held that federal registration does not
amount to governmental endorsement of the applicant's goods or
approval of the applicant's mark in any way.3" With the weakening of
both of section 2(a)'s "substantial" interests, the PTO must rely solely on

296. See supra note 141.
297. See supranote 141.
298. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
299. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (upholding prohibition on publications
that "expose[ ] the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or
which is productive of breach of the peace or riots.").
300. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519, 528 (1972) (striking down Georgia statute
prohibiting use of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace");
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (reversing Ku Klux Klan member's conviction
under a statute punishing individuals "who publish or circulate or display any book or paper
containing [violent] advocacy"); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978)
(permitting National Socialist Party to march through town of holocaust survivors).
301. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
302. 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
303. Id. at 177.
304. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1220 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
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the government's ability to regulate fraudulent, 05 obscene, 0 6 and
intentionally hatefiul3 7 commercial speech to sustain the cancellation of
WASHINGTON REDSKINS. However, these prohibitions do not apply
because Pro-Football's trademarks are not obscene,30 8 were registered in
good faith,3" 9 and have acquired strong secondary meaning that conveys
useful information to consumers about the source and quality of the
goods to which they are affixed.' Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court's plurality decision in 44 Liquormart indicates the demise of
section 2(a) trademark cancellations that fail to offer compelling
justifications.3 1'
VI. CONCLUSION
Pro-FootballInc. v. Harijo presents the Article m system with a rare
opportunity to address a trademark cancellation under section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act. When measured against protections available to intellectual
property owners in challenges before Article III courts, the liberal
standing requirements for opposition and cancellation proceedings
combined with Harjo'sexpansive disparagement doctrine present serious
risks to trademark owners' ability to obtain federal registration and
exercise their commercial speech rights. Accordingly, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia should disregard Harfo's "substantial
composite" standard and analyze Pro-Football's trademarks under
Greyhound's definition of disparagement. Furthermore, the district court
should declare section 2(a) unconstitutional as applied to Pro-Football's
trademarks. Absent heightened standing requirements, Haro's expansive
disparagement doctrine will continue to permit marginal litigation
against trademarks that do not cause actual harm. In this regard,
Congress should draft more objective "damage" criteria into sections 13
and 14 in order to limit section 2(a) challenges to invasions that the
government has a substantial interest in proscribing. Finally, Congress
should amend section 2(a)'s vague "scandalous" and "disparaging"

305. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
306. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
307. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992).
308. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
309. See Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1721 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
310. See supranote 44 and accompanying text.
311. See supranotes 145, 151-154 and accompanying text.
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rubric to limit the denial of federal trademark registration to only
obscene, fraudulent, misleading, and intentionally hateful trademarks.

1328

